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In the main office of the Border Police HQ of Copenhagen Airport, a screen presenting a black and white 
still-image of the border zone floor becomes animated when a person moves into the area. “3D people 
tracking sensors” in the ceiling identify a presence and a small white dot starts moving across the image. 
If the person queues up in front of the manual passport control, the dot turns bright red. If the person 
slows down by the ABC (Automated Border Control), the dot turns blue. White is movement, movement 
is good. At present, the many red and blue dots have turned into big blobs, indicating that too many 
people are queuing in the passport control instead of lingering in the shopping areas or reaching their 
flights. But in the Police HQ, no one looks at the screen, except the anthropologist, fascinated by the 
aesthetics of the imagery, the small moving dots that change colour, and by the fact that the border 
control guards are themselves being controlled. The border guards, on the other hand, don’t need the 
screen to know when people are crowding, they can hear it through the thin walls, see it from the 
“aquarium” and sense the bustle. But the red and blue dots are registered and audited in the offices of 
“CPH Airport”, the private company owning and running the entire airport complex, and the data will be 
used in the next negotiations with police management and Frontex about increasing flow and reducing 
retention on the Schengen border. 
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Introduction 
Border Security at Copenhagen Airport is maintained on a daily basis through the activities, intents and 
perspectives of a multiple and unstable assemblage of public and private actors and technologies. Two 
opposed types of motivations play the leading roles in this work: on the one hand, securing the national and 
Schengen borders against what are defined as intruders and threats and, on the other, a general pursuit of 
economic advantage and profit. Security plays a part in both, in itself becoming a negotiable commodity. The 
airport is a privileged site for analysing the blurring of responsibilities, decision-making and ongoing 
negotiations between different parties, because border security is produced by both public and private 
actors, and because the economic and the security stakes in this place are so obviously entwined and guide 
most interactions, as also exemplified by both Lyon’s and Salter’s analysis of airport security and surveillance 
(Lyon 2006, 2008; Salter 2008). Nevertheless, other stakes and motivations also clearly make their way into 
the functioning of the border security assemblage, both on the floor in the day-to-day management and 
production of security and control, and in the delocalized corridors of political and lobby negotiations 
between the various national, supranational and economic stakeholders. The interplay between diverse 
interests and motivations is furthermore highly unstable in that a multitude of phenomena and 
transformations continually come into play at all levels of the assemblage, in accordance with Deleuze & 
Guattari’s notion of it (1980). This makes the discernment of the processes and of the assemblage itself quite 
obtuse to the anthropologist’s eye and other senses, and thus also quite difficult to maintain in a stable, 
textual form. 
Blurring in this assemblage has two different facets. For one, there is a structural blurring: it is never 
really clear which actors are involved in border security measures and to what degree. Furthermore, the very 
often-conflicting agendas and interests of the involved actors are blurred, appearing on the surface as a 
coherent and harmonic border security apparatus. I describe this blurring of actors and interests as structural 
and the chapter starts by outlining the main stakeholders that produce border control and security at 
Copenhagen Airport, and the often-conflicting agendas that amalgamate and become indistinct in the daily 
application of human and technological measures of border security. A second type of blurring occurs in the 
particular instances where control authority is allocated, notably in every instance where a technology or a 
border guard decides whether to let someone pass or not. The chapter examines two such instances of 
control where the actual processes of decision-making and allocation of responsibilities and authority are 
blurred. The examples concern, for one, the negotiations for setting an acceptable threshold for facial 
recognition in an automated border control technology, and, secondly, the discretionary work of individual 
border guards in the profiling of passengers and the detection of potential threats. In both cases, I argue, 
these processes of decision-making constitute a blurring of border security by delocalizing, internalizing and 
individuating the border – respectively into the machine and into the individual border guard. So where one 
type of blurring concerns the unstable constituents of the assemblage, the other type concerns the blurring 
of the decisional actions it produces. 
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Borders, border studies & blurred assemblages 
In the emergent field of critical border studies, borders are not only conceptualized as inherently 
geographical and physical sites of deterrence but are also seen as ephemerally enacted through a wide range 
of encounters and connections, notably in and between databases, ID documents, EU regulations, consulate 
visa redactions, migrant practices, as well as being inscribed in the bodies of travellers themselves (Adey 
2009; Amoore 2006; Bigo 2002). When thinking through the eclectic notion of the assemblage, I however 
acknowledge that border making also does take place, localised in daily activities and encounters of various 
human and non-human agents, whether in passport controls, at airport counters or in asylum screening units. 
And this is indeed where an anthropological approach may be at its best, by bringing forth insights about the 
direct inter-human and human-technological workings of border production and management. A look into 
the everyday routines, happenstances and malfunctions of border guarding and the many actors that go into 
producing security on borders and producing secure borders, offers the opportunity to refine what by a more 
overall approach might somewhat hurriedly be described as a well-oiled and proficient system. As we shall 
see, the border assemblage is not a contradiction-less consistent monolithic whole, operated from far-away 
centres of computerized algorithmic intelligence, as other researchers of border production and security 
systems have also noted (e.g. Andrejevic and Gates 2014; Tsianos and Kuster 2016). When looking in more 
detail at the border security assemblage, it becomes apparent that it is instead composed of contradictory 
flows and desires, inconsistencies and absurdities. 
Furthermore, the border security assemblage is constellated of an incessant stream of “small 
decisions” that are “conditioned, but not completely predetermined” (Rabinow 2004, 63, in Rheinberger 
2009, 7), motivated and instantiated by individual and collegial interpretations of regulations and laws, as 
well as by affect (Adey 2009), by algorithms, and by externalisations and contrasting desires. I therefore argue 
that blurring in the border security assemblage arises in this lack of overarching predetermination and 
coherence, and in the operation of control though a series of infinitely small decisions, both human and 
technological. 
Fieldwork on the border 
The analysis in this chapter is based on fieldwork in Copenhagen Airport over a period of five months during 
2016-2017. During this fieldwork, I accompanied police and civil border guards from the Airport Border Guard 
Police Unit of Copenhagen Police that secure the Schengen border. For one, I sat in with the border guards 
as they surveyed the ABC (Automated Border Control) eGates. This implied ensuring that the automation 
was working, scrutinizing travellers, following the passport and facial controls on a screen, overruling or 
“helping” the system when it had “difficulties” recognizing travellers or for other reasons did not open the 
eGates’ glass doors, and making informed judgements when there were “hits” between controlled traveller 
IDs and the different national, European and international police and Schengen data bases that the 
recognition system was linked up to. Secondly, I sat in with agents that manually controlled passports and 
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visas of travellers leaving for or arriving from non-Schengen countries. Thirdly, I followed the police agents 
when they made “random sampling” controls at intra-Schengen flights arriving from so-called “high-risk” 
European countries. I furthermore participated in the two daily briefings of the border police unit, in the 
short training sessions dispensed by the “DocuUnit” specialized in document fraud and falsification, and in 
the surveillance of various sites via CCTV and other types of screen work. Through this work, I also got insights 
into the general border security work undertaken by private stakeholders, the diverse surveillance 
technologies at play and the work of the two private companies that produce, install and maintain the ABC 
eGates. 
I did not conduct formal interviews. Rather, I discussed procedures and events over lunch and talked 
with border guards while we watched people, screens and movement, interrogating together what we saw. 
I participated in meetings and briefings, and I was myself interviewed about my work by management, by 
unionists, by airport security, all producing insightful materials about how they saw their work. I took 
handwritten notes, both by preference and because any digital technology would be seen as too intrusive, 
even though the field was full of such technologies. I also took occasional photos with my phone. Everyone 
had a phone on them; it was an accepted work tool, part of the uniform. 
During fieldwork, I wore a police sign and was therefore addressed by travellers as a police officer. I 
observed the work of the border control agents I accompanied and took notes, and travellers appeared to 
classify me as a higher-ranking officer in the police hierarchy since I was ostensibly overseeing and controlling 
the agents. This was an unusual and challenging position to be in and a predicament that I continually 
analysed and tried to learn from as a constituent of the border world itself. Indeed, in some people’s eyes, I 
was the border. This set some very particular frames for the fieldwork, notably concerning the temporal and 
spatial outreach of what I could perceive of the travellers’ routes, hitherto and beyond this space, the nature 
of what they told me, depending on how they positioned me, and how I in turn could address them. In sum, 
the span of my perspective and thus knowledge about the travellers was narrowed down to what a police 
officer would hear. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, it is “what one participates in that becomes one’s 
field, one’s empirical object”, and thus what one can get to know something about, and not the other way 
around (Møhl 2011, 243). It was frustrating at first but also an important acknowledgement about my 
analytical object and scope: I was here to get insight into police and border guard procedures and 
perspectives, and not to obtain an all-embracing overview of the border world nor of particular migrant 
itineraries and dreams for the future. Indeed, this was the position I had allotted myself and that the police 
management had surprisingly willingly allowed me to take up. 
The border security stakeholders at CPH Airport 
At Copenhagen Airport, a complex assemblage of public and private stakeholders and a multitude of minute 
daily human and technological actors and actions go into the daily production of border security, working 
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through a structural blurring that makes it difficult to discern the distribution of authority and the conflicting 
agendas. 
Copenhagen Airport is the main Danish airport, but also serves as an entry-point into Scandinavia and 
functions as the international airport for the greater part of Southern Sweden, besides constituting a 
Schengen entry point. The public security actors are of various national and international constellations: the 
Danish state represented by Copenhagen Border Police and the DocuUnit of the National Police are in charge 
of border control and general security, and Frontex, an EU agency, coordinates national border control and 
carries out sometimes unannounced checks at the airport to audit the efficiency of the national border units. 
Alongside these public actors, a variety of private actors contribute to the security assemblage: The airport 
itself is run by “CPH Airports” (CPH), a predominantly private company currently owned in majority by a 
Canadian holder. CPH and its sub-group, CPH Security, are in charge of all entry and exit security checks of 
goods and persons at the airport.1 A multitude of airline and security companies, as well as the many retailers 
and food stalls also carry out large measures of security and movement control and contribute to the overall 
security assemblage. A range of private companies provides and maintains the wide variety of technologies 
of control employed by both public and private actors. Outsourcing is thus an important factor of the 
assemblage, entangling connections and further blurring the interplay of border security practices at the 
airport. This to a large extent obstructs an overview of the measures of coercion at play (Adey 2009; Bloom 
and Risse 2016). Furthermore, a variety of security and border control technologies and practices operate 
both on location and at a distance as externalizations, both through data exchanges and as actual 
deterritorialized control activities outside the airport. So the assemblage is far-reaching, obtuse and of many 
formats and materialities. 
Although these actors constitute an assemblage of “heterogeneous objects” that “‘work’ together as 
a functional entity” (Patton 1994, 158, in Haggerty & Ericson, 608), they are also aligned by opposing interests 
and desires, notably flow vs. efficient control and profit vs. legal action, as we shall see. Furthermore, if the 
assemblage produces operations that momentarily capture and fixate flows (ibid.), that fixation is itself a 
sight of friction and continued negotiation between all these different private and public actors. From the 
vantage point of their different desires – legal, practical, economic, temporal, individual – they produce 
different forms of security, and those desires and the ensuing operations are more or less tangible and simple 
to detect, indeed often quite obscure, hidden and in some cases, themselves only arduously subject to 
external scrutiny and control, notably by state, EU and NGO agencies. 
With this outline of the actors and agendas, we can now look closer at the allocation of authority 
through particular instances where blurring takes place and is situated. To do so, I will first present the overall 
work of border control at the Schengen airport border. 
                                                             
1 CPH Airports employs ca. 2.500 persons, of which ca. 1.200 alone work at CPH Security. 
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Controlling the Schengen border 
Airplanes flying to CPH from non-Schengen countries arrive at Pier C, coming mainly from the Middle-East 
and Turkey, Asia, the US and from European non-Schengen member states, such as the UK. Of the roughly 
80.000 persons who daily travel in and out of CPH Airport, 19.500 cross the Schengen border. As a heightened 
security measure, all documents are currently scanned, meaning that no discrimination based on profiling 
takes place. Border control is done by police officers and by first-line civil officers who have gone through a 
nine weeks training program. The civil officers have only a controlling and not an executive faculty, and call 
in second-line police officers in case of database “hits” or questions of possible document or identity fraud. 
But in the checking booths, they do exactly the same work as the police officers. Because of both carrier 
responsibility and ID verification at check-in, persons who arrive at the airport border almost always have 
documents. Only in the rare cases where people seek international protection do they arrive at the border 
without documents to show. The work therefore mainly consists of checking that 1) the presented document 
is valid and not counterfeit or forged, 2) the holder is also the person presented in the document, i.e. not 
travelling with someone else’s genuine document, called “impersonation” (Frontex 2013), and 3) the 
document and visa are valid for passage across this particular border and into Denmark and Schengen, both 
for Schengen citizens and third-country nationals with Schengen member-state residence permits. 
The people who are intercepted at the border fall into roughly three categories: persons travelling on 
visas or identity cards that do not permit travel into or out of Denmark or Schengen (by far the biggest 
group)2; persons who have a national or international arrest warrant against them; and persons travelling on 
another person’s genuine documents (currently the most commonly reported document fraud).3 Besides 
such cases, certain persons are also under national or international surveillance, their moves being 
“discretely monitored”, which means that the border guards note down their passage but do not apprehend 
or engage in any direct interaction with them. Both for “discretely monitored” persons and arrest warrants, 
the scanned document will give rise to a “hit” in one of the connected databases. But many “hits” concern 
persons who are wanted but for whom the identification elements are incomplete, leading to a long series 
of “false hits”, e.g. because a surname or part of a document number coincide with the traveller’s. In all 
cases, a police officer will inspect the ID of the traveller and determine whether the person in question can 
access (or leave) Danish/Schengen territory or should be held back for further inspection, be arrested or 
simply denied passage. 
At Copenhagen Airport, a series of Automated Border Control (ABC) eGates have recently been 
installed, with the main goal of heightening security from the standpoint that facial recognition technologies 
                                                             
2 Defined as “unauthorised secondary movement of third-country nationals” (European Commission 2017). Such cases 
also include visa overstay. 
3 Among travelers leaving Denmark/Schengen there are also many cases of overstay, either concerning visas or 
temporary EU residence permits. In such cases, there is a certain ambivalence among the guards about whether to let 
them leave the country “a bit late” or to stop them for offence, depending on the duration of the overstay. This 
ambivalence is related to the perplexing notion of individual intuitive discretion - skøn - that Danish police officers are 
required to apply in their decision making (Holmberg 2000) and that will be discussed further on. 
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and biometric passports provide more efficient forms of control. Another motivation for installing the costly 
technology is to comply with the airport’s request for a higher flow at the border. But in fact, according to 
the police officers operating on the border, the eGates are not necessarily quicker. They furthermore imply 
a deskillment of the human control agents with the risk of replacing them with more machines to cut down 
on wage expenses, as the union representatives complain. Finally, the algorithmic settings of the eGates can 
be – and are – negotiated between police agencies, CPH Airport and the technology developer, Vision-Box, 
to heighten flow, notably by lowering the threshold for the required match between the ID photo and the 
live facial capture at the ABC eGates, as we shall see. 
In the following I will examine the work of the ABC eGates and the kind of blurring it represents in the 
production of border security. This analysis will be followed by the description of the random identity checks 
that border police guards are requested to carry out at intra-Schengen flights, looking for what is defined as 
“high-risk” travellers. In both cases, the blurring arises through mechanisms of dislocation of border security 
from the actual border when control and responsibility are projected respectively into an algorithmic figure 
and onto the individual border guard’s subjective discretional interpretation and judgement, thereby 
obfuscating both the actual acts of decision-making and their incentives, as well as the respective influences 
and opposing interests of the multiple constituents of the security assemblage. 
Case 1: Human-technological border work 
At the ABC eGates, Sandra, a civil border control agent, is checking incoming passengers from non-Schengen 
countries, currently from a US and a UK flight. To pass through the eGate, the passengers need to have a 
biometric EU (or EEA) “ePassport”. The British are good at passing quickly, Sandra says. They’re used to facial 
recognition because they have the same kind of machines at Heathrow. The passengers queue up in front of 
the six active gates, waiting behind a yellow line. When one has passed, a green light invites the next 
passenger to approach and scan his or her passport. After a while the first glass door opens and lets the 
passenger enter the small enclosure between the two glass doors where he/she is invited to move up to the 
facial scan camera and stand on the two yellow footprints on the floor. A second-line police officer steps in 
to indicate the right position, “if they are fooling around in there”, as he says. – “Stand still, not too close”. 
“Take off your glasses”. “Take off your hat”. “Remove your veil”. “Look at the camera”. 
Sandra sits in the tall glass booth that gives an overview of the six eGates. From here she surveys 
people moving into the ABC zone, the persons queuing and the persons inside the six eGates – scrutinizing 
their faces and their behaviour, checking if they suddenly change route and choose the manual passport 
control, keeping an eye on her screens and communicating by radio with the second-line officer and her 
colleagues in the other booths. She has two screens. One relates the operations and images of the ABC, how 
it is functioning, how each facial recognition scores, whether there are problems, for example if the passport 
photo and the facial scan don’t match, or if the machine indicates that there are two persons in the gate. She 
overrides the ABC and opens the exit gate manually if she can see “it is getting confused” and if she can 
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identify the reasons – a person with a lot of hand luggage that is identified as two, or a person that the 
machine cannot recognize whereas Sandra can easily make the match between the chip and passport images 
on the screen and the actual face she can see through her window. She is “learning to see in 2D”, she says, 
like the machine, comparing a 2D screen photo to an actual physical 3D face. The other screen on the table 
indicates that the connection to the different national and international police data bases is up and running 
and gives alerts when there are hits – correspondences – between the ABC information and the data bases. 
If so, the second gate does not open automatically and a fat red edge and a red triangle with a “!” appears 
on the image on the ABC screen. In this case, Sandra reads the information provided by the data bases, 
assesses the nature of the correspondence, e.g. between information about an Interpol search warrant and 
the information provided on the person in the ABC eGate via the passport. If in doubt, she calls upon the 
second-line officer to make an assessment and decide which action to take. With most cases, the “hit” is a 
false hit. But once in a while a passenger is pulled aside for further inquiry or held back if formally identified 
as wanted or, for example, as having to hand in a driver’s licence that has been withdrawn. As such, the ABC 
also works as a justified site of control of offences not related to border crossing. 
Sandra moves over to the outgoing ABC eGate. A person of what she identifies as of East African origin 
arrives at the ABC and stops to look. He then moves over to the manual passport control and she calls her 
colleagues there and tells them that he has moved away from the ABC eGate. As it turns out, he has come in 
from Italy and is trying to take a plane to the UK on a EU passport that is not his own. He probably decided 
not to risk the facial control, since the machine is better at recognizing African faces than Europeans are, she 
says. She asks me why that is, thinking there might be a “natural”, anthropological explanation to it. She tells 
me that on her guard last week an airline security agent called in the police because a traveller had been 
stopped from boarding a Heathrow flight when trying to travel with another person’s passport. The DocuUnit 
apprehended the traveller and ran him through the ABC three times, and he almost passed once. “So 
sometimes the machine works better, sometimes the human eye does”. 
Over lunch I ask one of Sandra’s colleagues what he thinks about the ABC and if he sometimes works 
there. “No.” He doesn’t like it; he prefers human contact. Another officer declares he also dislikes the ABC: 
“The machine can’t think. It’s stupid and can only obey orders given by humans. It can’t think ahead. I have 
intuition, I’m creative.” And, he says, if the bosses or the airport company for some reason want a higher 
flow, they can just turn down the machine’s vigilance with a click of a mouse, while “They can’t turn down 
mine.” 
Technological negotiations as a blurring of responsibilities  
When Sandra sits in her booth repeatedly looking up, out and down – up at people’s faces, out over the 
queues and down at her screens – and taking small decisions every time she hits a button or clicks with the 
mouse, she is in the middle of a wide and complex assemblage where a lot of other actors of various kinds 
play out important roles in the control of the border. As mentioned, assemblages emerge “out of a lot of 
small decisions” (Rabinow 2004, in Rheinberger 2009, 7). I have already described the many public, private, 
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material and immaterial actors that co-constitute the assemblage, and Sandra’s and her second-line officer’s 
actions also form minute parts of the ongoing border security assemblage. The framework for their decisions 
is set up by CPH Airport, by Danish Police management, by the Danish government, by EU and Frontex, and 
the many laws and directives they all produce; by the wide range of technologies involved in the security 
control; by the intentions, possibilities and interventions of the passing travellers; by the airline companies 
who maintain their own borders to avoid carrier responsibility fines and secure their flights; by the many 
private security companies they all engage; by the technology developers and maintenance groups, both 
private and in-house; by the weather and the time of year – in summer on sunny days, the ABC camera gets 
sun “in its eyes” and “can’t see well”; by travel trends and economic fluctuations; by union policies, and 
collegial connections and considerations, by their daily well-being and health-conditions; and by the interplay 
of all those innumerable factors and many more. There is overtly intentional conditioning – the design of the 
environment, protocols for action, assignment of authority – but there are very few of those intentional 
conditionings that actually turn into predictable and predetermined outputs. 
In this blurred configuration, we can nevertheless determine some of the conditionings that define 
what it takes for the glass doors of the ABC eGates to open and let a traveller through. This has to do with 
negotiating the setting of the required threshold for the facial recognition technology: CPH sets up flow 
detection monitoring screens in the police HQ on the border so the police officers in charge can see when 
they are slowing down the passenger flow, retaining potential customers who should instead be retained – 
and tempted – in the shopping areas. On the background of a black-&-white photo of the border zone, 
retained passengers appear in real-time as small red dots, rapidly accumulating into a red mass when flow in 
the manual passport control is low. People moving are presented as neutral white dots and people waiting 
at the ABC are represented as blue dots. CPH not only makes this “dot stream” (Xovis 2017) available to the 
border police, as we saw above, but also transforms the dots and their respective colours into figures and 
graphs. They use these audits to calculate actual flow and staffing needs and allot passenger assistants 
(“frogs” as they are called by police staff because of their green t-shirts). More importantly, they use them 
to negotiate with the border police about spatial organisation, border guard staffing and in their requests for 
the acquisition of new technological equipment as well as the running of current technology. 
The white dots moving on the monitors constitute instances of “blank figures” that can become 
anything (Serres 1991; Svendsen 2011), bodies without ID. They are even merchandised as “anonymous” by 
the developer (Xovis 2017). What counts (is counted) is not who they are, but what they might do, imbued 
as they are with very different types of potential: to the airport company and many shop holders, they 
constitute potential customers moving towards goods of consumption – when not upheld in the passport 
control (“red”, “blue”). To the border police, the blank figures are uncertain and undetermined presences, 
possible threats to security until firmly ID’ed. 
Police management and unions negotiate with CPH and with the private Portuguese firm Vision-Box 
and its Danish maintenance provider, Biometric Solutions, about the settings (the system acceptance 
threshold) of the necessary score level of facial recognition in the ABC, in compliance with loose Frontex 
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recommendations. The “dot streams” are used by CPH in these negotiations. The goal is to find a balance 
between flow and retention, between false positives and false negatives. Frontex recommends a facial 
recognition score of, say 50, whereas CPH wants to lower it to 42 to heighten flows.4 Copenhagen Police 
wants to comply with Frontex recommendations and set the threshold at 50 for higher security, but the 
maintenance provider sets the threshold somewhere in between, for the moment. It is difficult – for all 
involved – to determine who has actually made the decision, but the border guards can see on the screen 
that people now pass with a lower recognition score – and they know that a technician from Biometric 
Solutions did indeed change the settings with the click of a mouse. In this negotiation, the threshold level, 
one simple number – e.g. “46” – comes to contain and encapsulate all the divergent desires and their on-
going negotiations, transforming threats, regulations, security levels, document fraud, state policies, EU 
directives as well as seamlessness, flow, travel experience, pleasure, human rights, and so on, into one single 
figure. Click! Every time a person passes through the ABC eGate, several facial scan samples are made and 
run through the system while the doors stay closed in both ends. The algorithmically configured results are 
held up against the template in the passport and if the magic figure, e.g. 47 or 88, is reached, the exit door 
opens automatically. The figure is somewhat arbitrary because it is the result of opposing forces but comes 
to encapsulate and actualize the required level of recognition, i.e. how much one is required to resemble the 
ID-photo of oneself in order to be considered oneself – a match! – and for the door to open. 
The threshold figure is so unequivocal – it is a simple number – yet constitutes an effective blurring. 
For one, it is a figure that many of the involved can’t see, suspended as it is between all these different actors 
and their on-going negotiations to find a middle ground between their differing agendas. And it is a blurring 
– opacification – by virtue of its oneness that signals consensus and thus nullifies all the existing differentials, 
tensions and contentions. But they are not resolved; they are simply glossed over. And every time the 
threshold figure strikes again and the door opens, the nullification of contentions and the blurring of 
responsibilities is replayed. Again, the “blank figure” or joker, here in the form of the threshold, represses all 
contention, taking it “to zero” (Serres 1991). Quite inversely, however, every time the white dots on the 
Police HQ monitors become blue, they effectively display and reiterate the existence of discordance and 
conflicting desires. 
The airline companies are ambivalent, both interested in getting passengers through border control 
quickly so they don’t derange flight schedules and on assuring both flight security and ID control, because 
they risk a fine and having to fly people back to their site of embarkation. They therefore do their own ID 
checks upon boarding. This is yet another example of decision-making responsibility being indirectly 
                                                             
4 The recognition (or similarity) score refers to the similarity between the features of respectively the face in the ABC 
eGate and in the passport photo. There is rarely a 100% match, but photo and face should match to a certain degree, 
indicating the accepted “recognition threshold”. The threshold and thus the required similarity score can be raised or 
lowered, making it more or less easy to pass. - The figures on the screen range between 0 and 100, but do not indicate 
a percentage, but a score, as a Vision-Box representative repeatedly stated when the border guards talked of percent. 
Calling them percent, as in “you only need to look 49% like your passport photo”, is probably considered by developers 
and policy-makers as a misguided indication of low border security, as in “only half good enough”. 
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allocated to singular actors within the assemblage, making it more difficult to control and critique. But if the 
distribution of responsibilities is blurred, the assemblage is in no way a well-oiled machine. On the contrary, 
it is composed of diverging desires and objectives, conflicting interests and actions, and national and 
international and profit-seeking wishes, where specific actors often are pointed out by the others, getting 
fines or admonitions for mistakes and miscalculations that might be attributed to them. It is not a coherent 
pre-programmed whole, but a nervous and constantly fluctuating constellation of interconnected moves and 
desires, collisions and friction operating “across difference and distance” (Tsing 2005, 2), and appearing to 
both participating and external actors are opaque and blurred. 
Case 2: Controlling “high-risk” flights 
Border police officers regularly carry out random security and ID checks at flights arriving from Schengen 
countries. Such random checks are permitted within EU regulations under certain conditions, namely that 
they are random, which by the border police is defined as non-permanent and concerning only a certain 
amount of flights per week. The randomness in itself constitutes a blurring of responsibility, since all decisions 
are discretionary, taken by individual police officers without formal orders or protocols. The blurring thus 
takes the form of an individuation of border control, transferring – allocating – responsibility to the individual 
border guard. These checks are firmly audited by the police management, both to monitor that the work is 
being done and to document the number of checks in case of Frontex controls - even if the border police’s 
work is not “to produce figures”, as a police officer in charge stated. The checks are carried out by armed 
police officers and not civilian agents, because they are “out in the open”. 
Walking to Pier F where we will await the arrival of a low-cost plane from an Italian city, I accompany 
Hans, a short and sturdily built police agent and his new female colleague who is carrying out a random check 
for the first time. He is explaining the principles to her as well as the incidents with passengers that such 
checks sometimes give rise to. “We’re looking for illegal immigrants. So we don’t stop Mr. and Mrs. Hansen.” 
While we wait, I ask him how he can see whom to pick out if he is not allowed to stop everyone. He has some 
tricks, he says. He can for example detect undocumented Afghan men, i.e. people who haven’t been here 
before or don’t live here, without checking their passports. “They try to blend in but always look sort of inept-
smart. You know, jeans with holes in them. Sunglasses. And there’s always something with the shoes, they 
never fit the rest. Too fancy.” 
The flight arrives and they take up position at the exit of the gangway. Almost all passengers are Danish 
tourists coming home. But four are of African origins, arriving one by one. The first two are pulled aside, and 
are asked to produce their documents. They don’t put up any resistance. A couple of other passengers frown 
or slow down, but do not intervene. A third is pulled aside and a fourth passes by the officers who are 
occupied checking the others. All three checked have the necessary documents. Once checked, Hans smiles 
to them and wishes them a safe journey. He notes down the flight number and the number of checked 
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persons on an old piece of paper so the officer on duty can enter it into “the system” and the two walk off to 
the other end of the airport to check a flight arriving from Athens. 
“High-risk” profiling as a blurring of responsibilities 
So how does the randomness and the notion of “high-risk flights” configure and blur the nature of what is 
going on and the “production of suspicion” (Murphy & Maguire 2015, 165)? “High risk” is used in a double 
sense by Frontex, as both a way to optimize resources by applying them to regions of “high risk” of migration 
influx (Council of the European Union 2017), i.e. an organizational sense, and geographically, when referring 
to specific places of origin - although “high risk” in this case ostensibly relates to routes (Kasparek 2010) and 
thus not to nationalities. Somewhat in accordance, at Copenhagen Airport, certain flights are defined as high-
risk because they arrive from cities within Schengen that Frontex and the national authorities consider 
possible avenues of “illegal migrants” and refugees. They count Milan, Rome, Athens and other Greek and 
Italian and, to some extent, Spanish cities, i.e. intra-Schengen routes that normally are exempt of border 
control, but where there are high levels of arrivals of undocumented persons from the Middle East, Asia and 
Africa. So, when the border police randomly control such flights, i.e. submit only some flights and only some 
passengers to control, the notion of “high-risk” comes to relate directly to the countries of origin of the 
possible migrants and asylum seekers, meaning that they are in fact profiling nationalities and not just 
checking routes. And as a result, the persons who are effectively pulled aside when leaving the plane are all, 
almost per definition, people who ostensibly come from non-Schengen countries. “High-risk” thus logically, 
and also according to the border police officers themselves, implies that they must check people who “look 
high-risk”, for example like they come in from an African country or from the Middle East. And as several 
officers have declared when I inquired about these practices and the meaning of “high-risk”, this is 
paradoxical, because it makes them take decisions based on what effectively amounts to “racial profiling”. 
So the law at the same time prohibits and actively installs a system of racial and ethnic profiling. Furthermore, 
even if they might want to contest the legality and ethics of these random checks and the fact that they are 
making them “behave racist”,5 the unit is as mentioned required to produce a certain number of random 
checks per week for future Frontex and management audits, producing a classical “feedback loop” logic 
where only certain groups are controlled and where the figures therefore concern only these groups, thereby 
both reinforcing and justifying future controls of the same target groups (cf. Fassin 2013; Holmberg 2000). 
From the perspective of a security assemblage analysis, it is the configuration of the notion of “high 
risk” that merits attention, co-produced as it is by a number of different national and supra-national actors 
that more or less overtly contribute to its meaning, leading to very particular and discriminatory effects in 
the control of movement and the profiling of travellers. Furthermore, the principle of “randomness” 
                                                             
5 As one interlocutor despairingly noted, “If I wasn’t a racist before, this work is making me into one”. What she was 
referring to was not that her personal opinion vis-a-vis certain ethnic groups was changing, but that she was being asked 
to apply higher vigilance and suspicion to certain groups than to others, in what one could thus define as a case of 
“systemic racism”. 
13 
 
displaces the choice-making on to the individual police officers who come to determine which flights and 
which passengers are to be seen as “high-risk”, relocating responsibility onto the notorious “6th sense” and 
“gut feeling” of the individual officer, i.e. the legally installed discretion or hunch (skøn) (Holmberg 2000, 
2003; Brouwer et.al. 2018). This ultimately places any executive act within the field of subjective, intuitive 
and therefore impalpable, often unacknowledged and un-verbalised individual interpretation and 
discernment. So ultimately, “high-risk” and random checks contribute to a virtual blurring of the premises 
for and the production of border security at the airport. 
Conclusions 
The security assemblage operating on the heterogeneous border of Copenhagen Airport is made up of a 
complex of varying desires for both flow and retention, of contrasting political-organizational objectives and 
practical feasibilities. These are desires to which we have only a partial insight, both because of the transfer 
and blurring of responsibilities (Hönig 2014) and because of the way these desires continuously interact and 
contradict one another, making the functioning at every moment fluctuating and unsystematic. With Ulrich 
Beck’s term, we could define this blurring as an “organized irresponsibility” (2009), where the definitions of 
high-risk and of the necessary recognition thresholds are delegated to a variety of singular actors – in the 
two examples, facial recognition algorithms and individual officers’ discretion – that are difficultly 
identifiable. The recognition threshold of the ABC technology blurs the conflicts between public and private 
actors, as well as the unofficial negotiations between their conflicting agendas, while its oneness ostensibly 
signifies a perfect consensus between the actors. The “high-risk” notion blurs the responsibility of 
implementing national and EU migration policies by assigning responsibility and decisions to individual 
officers and their personal tactics, while imposing certain selective logics. The notion comes to produce very 
problematic procedures of discrimination, also in the eyes of those who are implementing them in their daily 
work. 
Such blurring makes the security assemblage difficult to assess and to control. No one ever really 
knows who is involved in producing border security in the different sites and how strongly they influence the 
procedures according to their variegated agendas. This is a predicament for both authoritative agencies on 
various levels, for NGOs wishing to protect human mobility and privacy rights (Bloom & Risse 2014) and for 
individuals trying to make their way through the security assemblage.  
It is also a predicament for the researcher wishing to gain an insight into the current state of affairs of 
local border work. But by following specific procedures in the daily work of border security agents who 
individually take a multitude of “small decisions” in their choice-making and interaction with the automated 
machines, it does become clear that there is no overarching predetermined and coherent border security 
machine at work. Some particular lines of force nevertheless stand out, both about the nature of the 
blurredness and about the redistribution of responsibilities, as the analysis of the examples has shown. 
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And finally, it is a predicament for the people and actors engaged in the daily work on the floor. The 
border guards feel their authority is being undercut and their know-how is waning as they become deskilled 
by machines that take over the scrutinizing, that can only re-cognize and not cognize, and that can’t think 
creatively. The machine does not work through discretion, but acts on a clear albeit arbitrarily set figure, and 
its vigilance level can be lowered by the click of a mouse. Who actually sets that figure is never really clear. 
The border guards can turn off the machine – and they sometimes do when it starts “glitching”, malfunctions 
in one gate “spreading to the others like a virus” – but when it is running, they can only assist it. The airline 
companies administer the work of border control without clear orders and with the risk of penalties if they 
transport persons who are not admissible. And travellers end up either caught in awkward and secluded 
locations or without the possibility to ask for the international protection to which they would be entitled, 
and the organizations that are trying to ensure that such rights are protected stand helpless. Possibly, and 
not surprisingly, the only actors who seem to pull an advantage from the incongruities, the blurring and the 
lack of clear responsibilities are the private contractors who carry out preventive control for the airline 
companies, the airport holdings that own and design airport spaces as vast shopping malls and sites of leisure, 
pleasure and new shopping experiences, as well as the private agencies that provide the vast array of costly 
technological infrastructures applied in security, surveillance, flow monitoring and border control. Security 
and border control certainly does slow down the flow of bodies-as-potential-customers – turning mobile 
white dots into reds blurbs – and thereby blemishes the performance of the airport as a site of pleasure and 
seamless movement provided by a coherent body. But going through security and border control at the same 
time becomes – and is commodified as – a reassuring and selective quality inherent to that exclusive pleasure 
and movement. 
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